ABSTRACT. The paper finds a strong negative correlation between youth employment and minimum wages for the panel of U. S. states, 1976-2007. Such a correlation is not observed in earlier panels. The source of the new results is traced to the greater variance of minimum wages across states emerging after about 2000.
INTRODUCTION
The effect of minimum wage legislation on employment represents an area where the predictions of simple economic theory are hotly contested by both economists and policymakers. The competitive model of the labor market predicts unambiguously that an increase in minimum wages would reduce employment, and for many years this was a touchstone of economic orthodoxy. This orthodoxy explained popular support for minimum wages as springing from a benign but misguided desire to help the poor -misguided because some of the poor are made better-off only by making others of the poor worse-off, the losses outweighing the gains. Card, Katz and Krueger's influential set of papers 1 however seems to find empirical evidence of the opposite effect if anything, consistent perhaps with some sort of large-scale monopsony power in labor markets. Card and Krueger have been seriously challenged on methodological grounds (see, in particular, the comments by Brown; Hamermesh; and Welch in Ehrenberg (1995) ). Perhaps more importantly, the result of a positive minimum wage-employment relationship has been subsequently questioned by other studies using data which cover identical time periods. 2 In any case, the struggle for the hearts and minds of policy-makers seems to have been won in the United States.
1 For a convenient summary of Card and Krueger (1994) ; Katz and Krueger (1992) ; Card (1992a,b) ; see Card and Krueger (1995) chapters 2-4. 2 For Card (1992a) , see Taylor and Kim (1995) ; for Card (1992b) , see Deere et al. (1995) ; for Card and Krueger (1994) , see Neumark and Wascher (2000) , although Card and Krueger (2000) should also be viewed in response. A comprehensive recent summary of the evidence is provided by Neumark and Wascher (2008) .
Federal minimum wages were increased by a combined 21% in 1996 and 1997. The 1999 Economic Report of the President stated that "the weight of the evidence suggests that modest increases in the minimum wage have had very little or no effect on employment." (Yellen, 1999; 112) . There has clearly been a shift in fashion.
When Brown et al. published in 1982 their detailed review of the literature existing up to that date, they concluded that the balance of evidence was that minimum wages exert a detectable, though small, negative effect on employment -a short-run elasticity of -0.1 or less say -with a rather stronger and easier-to-find effect on youth employment. 4 Typically, this evidence was derived from time series studies of labor markets. In contrast, the "New Minimum Wage Research" era, starting with the publication of four influential papers by Card (1992a, b) , Katz and Krueger (1992) , and Neumark and Wascher (1992) 
in the Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, has seen no such consensus. The key papers are Krueger (1994, 2000) . They study an event, the increase in minimum wages in New Jersey in 1992, and find that, compared to Pennsylvania where there was no such increase, employment in fast-food restaurants increased somewhat. While in some specifications this effect is not significantly positive, it is certainly not negative. 5 An intrinsic problem with event studies in this context is that the sought effect is acknowledged to be small compared to ambient fluctuation in employment rates.
Annual changes in state employment rates have a standard deviation of around 2%, which is the expected fall in employment for a 20% increase in the real wage if the received wisdom is correct. Clearly this could easily be missed by chance. Kennan (1995) has likened the quest for minimum wage effects to trying to find a needle in a haystack.
In this paper we shall consider the employment effects of minimum wages in the panel of U.S. states in annual data from 1976 to 2007. In many ways, our approach is much in the spirit of the original panel study by Neumark and Wascher (1992) and it is appropriate to offer some justification for a return to this venerable and -one might have thought -exhausted topic. 6 The point is simply that the observed behaviour of state minimum wages over the last few years contains a vast increase in the amount of information bearing on the effects of minimum wages on employment. The reason is that, following the turn of the millennium, an increasing number of states enacted their own minimum wage laws, as distinct from merely acquiescing in the federal 5 Though Wascher (1995a,b), (1996) have argued that, while total employment may not have fallen, there was significant replacement of black and Hispanic teenagers by white teenagers dropping out of school, which would be a remarkable example of the law of unintended consequences. 6 Other influential studies that have used state panels similar to this paper are Card and Krueger (1995) , Deere et al. (1995) , and Burkhauser et al. (2000) . what is new is that an estimate of this magnitude and apparent statistical significance has not previously been observed in these data. 7 Figure 1 shows how the estimated coefficient and its confidence interval vary with the end-point of the sample. End of sample period 7 While some panel studies have found elasticities of this magnitude and higher (in absolute terms), they have had to resort to either omitting time fixed effects (Burkhauser et al., 2006) , use additional control variables (Sabia, 2008) , choose a later sample period and quarterly data plus a different employment category (inter alia, Dube et al. (2007) , or focus on a smaller number of states (Sabia and Burkhauser, 2008) .
One observes the not-obviously-negative estimate from 1992, with the bulk of the confidence interval being positive. Over time, and particularly after 2000, the confidence interval has shrunk and migrated south, now living exclusively in the negative zone. Clearly the larger dataset has changed the game.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we discuss the evolution of 
THE BEHAVIOUR OF STATE MINIMUM WAGES
In a regression of state employment on state minimum wages where one controls for time fixed effects, one obtains identifying variance only to the extent that some state minimum wages are greater than the federally mandated minimum wage. Figure 2 shows how the number of states with higher minimum wages has evolved 1976-2007. 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 At the beginning of 1976 just two states, Connecticut and New Jersey, had higher- Renato Ricciuti had sued the company for failing to pay overtime wages to its dispatchers. "Davenport's defence was that in crafting the FLSA, Congress denied individual states jurisdiction over the subject issues unless those states enacted laws providing higher coverage for the employees. Since Connecticut law provided only equal coverage, the employer prevailed." (Ronald Marquis, communication by e-mail, July 22, 2008). Mr. Marquis then speculates that as a result of this ruling the legislature was concerned to establish its jurisdiction in future cases involving minimum wage levels and thus ensured that the state's minimum wage would always be higher than the federal minimum wage. The point here is that Connecticut did not have a higher than federal minimum wage because of some conscious labor market policy, but rather as a result of an unrelated law suit, which, as it turned out, was subsequently found to be erroneous and of no legal consequence by a court in Alaska. These cycles in minimum wages act to increase the cross-state variance in minimum wages. Figure 3 shows the coefficient of variation. 
where it mw is now the minimum wage having taken out two-way fixed effects, and 
ECONOMETRIC ISSUES
To obtain plausible predictions from such thought-experiments as a 1% increase in the state minimum wage, one requires a structural relationship that can in principle remain stable while such experiments are performed. Such a relationship will inevitably contain other conditioning variables. In a simple world where the wage was always set above the supply-demand equilibrium, so that employment was determined along a labor demand curve, these conditioning variables would be those that describe 
where the conditioning set s is a large vector of the stocks of capital and knowledge discussed above.
In practice, nothing like this detailed set of variables is observed and one is forced to resort to proxies. Allowing for two-way fixed effects takes account of U.S.-wide conditioning variables as well as once-and-for-all state effects. In the past (Keil et al., 2000) we have added state trends in female labor participation, the share of youth in the population, and real wages; Neumark and Wascher (1992) include the proportion of youth in school but not working. One can interpret these and other approaches as seeking to account for non-minimum-wage trends in labor supply by readily-available data. The problem is that the wage elasticities so derived are not particularly convincing because the specification-search underlying them tends not to be an objective statistical procedure. Card and Krueger (1995) , in particular, have made this a centre-piece of their criticism of the existing literature. We propose in this study to model the conditioning variables simply as error-components: two-way fixed effects plus state-specific trends. Specifically, we shall assume the effect of the conditioning variables is given by: The main virtue of removing two-way fixed-effects (2WFEs) in our context is that the procedure will purge the underlying structural equation of U.S.-wide variables, which would otherwise be consigned to the residual. Such omitted variables will not create bias when they are uncorrelated with the variable of interest, but removing them may lead to greater econometric efficiency, provided the ensuing reduction in error variance more than off-sets the reduction in variance of the transformed variable of interest.
A perhaps more pertinent case arises when the omitted variables are correlated with the variable of interest, when their omission will lead to bias in the estimate of the parameter of interest. Assume that the observed youth employment-population ratio is comprised of three components:
1. macroeconomic factors associated with the business cycle (e.g. monetary shocks);
2. deep labour-supply variables determining the trend in youth participation;
3. minimum wage effects in sub-markets.
In large part, the observed behaviour of the employment-population ratio will be determined by the first two components, which are essentially unrelated to the minimum wage. Consider the first component. It turns out that the (real) minimum wage is somewhat pro-cyclical in the time-series of aggregate data and similarly procyclical in panel data (see below). A natural interpretation of this is that legislatures are reluctant to increase minimum wages when unemployment is high. In the absence of any neo-classical minimum-wage mechanism, this form of endogeneity would cause the employment-population ratio to be positively correlated with the minimum wage. This will create a positive bias to the minimum wage parameter (i.e. towards zero if the true parameter is negative) which would be removed or ameliorated by time fixed-effects, to the extent that the Federal government is the major player in minimum-wage setting. This does not solve the problem of state sensitivity to the business cycle. Some experiments with instrumental variables suggest this source of bias is not particularly important. In any case, since the bias is towards zero, assuming the minimum wage is exogenous should make it harder to find negative minimum wage effects on unemployment.
The second component may lead to a similar bias. Assume for example the observed downwards trend in youth participation is driven by a trend increase in household wealth. 12 Given that compassion for the poor, even if misguided, is income-elastic, then trends in minimum wages will also be driven by wealth. 13 As with the business cycle, the inclusion of time fixed-effects will eliminate at least the U.S. component of the common wealth-effect, and thus reduce bias, even when state-specific trends are not included. Note that the likely direction of bias from wealth effects is negative, so that estimates are higher in magnitude.
A final virtue of time fixed-effects is that they turn the RHS of the regression equation into a real variable, namely the state minimum wage relative to the U.S.
average, to match the LHS. An alternative is to deflate the minimum wage by average wages or prices, the choice here depending on the specific structural model underpinning the empirical analysis. The problem is that this introduces a strongly endogenous variable on the RHS. In some models the appropriate deflator for the minimum wage will be a U.S.-wide variable (a monetary variable say) in which case the inclusion of time fixed-effects with the nominal minimum wage gives the correct result. Even when this is not the case, it is quite likely that serious bias will not arise from assuming it is.
Finally dynamics. Equation (2) will produce an estimate of the instantaneous ownprice elasticity of the minimum wage. An increase in minimum wages may in principle have a larger effect via second-round effects on the stock and structure of capital, but these are missed when these variables are treated as given. Even with given technology, adjustment costs will generate dynamic rather than static relationships, but it has been argued that such costs are likely to be small because of the ease with which employment levels may be adjusted for high-turnover workers (Brown et al., 1982; Card and Krueger, 1995) . This would apply especially to young workers, the focus of our analysis. Adjustment dynamics may well be more important for older workers. We shall make some rudimentary allowance for dynamic relationships by allowing for serial persistence in the error structure.
YOUTH EMPLOYMENT AND THE MINIMUM WAGE
We begin with some data description. Figure 5 graphs the U.S. aggregate unemployment rate and the state averages of the (logs of the) youth employmentpopulation rate and the minimum wage relative to the U.S. GDP deflator, 1976 GDP deflator, -2007 Longitudinal means have been removed. There is perhaps a slight downwards trend observable in all three variables, most pronounced for the employment-population rate. The latter is well documented especially for the post 1998 period (on this see, e.g. Aaronson et al., 2006) . Taking the unemployment rate as a negative indicator of the business cycle, one sees that the youth employment-population ratio is strongly pro-cyclical, but that the real minimum wage is not obviously pro-or anti-cyclical. These impressions are confirmed by the correlation matrix in Table 1 , where all variables have had a linear trend removed: Rather than pass immediately to the model foreshadowed in (2) and (3), we find it instructive to begin with the simple models one might consider if one were to approach the data afresh. Table 2 Model 0 is the benchmark, where the employment-population ratio is regressed on two-way fixed-effects only. One sees that these two explain about 86% of the variation in the (log of the) employment-population ratio. Model 1 is the "minimalist" regression where the log of the minimum wage is added. The minimum wage parameter is substantial and apparently well-determined. This is in contrast to both Card and Krueger (1995) and Burkhauser et al. (2000) who find the coefficient to be insignificant once time fixed effects (or year dummies in monthly data) are added.
However, Addison et al. (2008) find a coefficient similar to ours in size using county level quarterly data for the restaurants-and-bars sector.
The tabulated (unadjusted) regression R 2 is calculated as the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable explained by the model, including any fixedeffects and any AR structure fitted to the residuals: thus the addition of the minimum wage increases the proportion explained by only 0.3%, despite a calculated t-statistic for the estimate of 6.2.
Model 2 considers the regression when only state fixed-effects are included with the minimum wage. The estimated parameter falls somewhat: this is consistent with the possibility raised in Section 3, namely that time fixed-effects eliminate a national business-cycle component which is positively associated with minimum wages. In contrast, the state component of minimum wages does not appear to create bias: if we instrument the minimum wage in the minimalist model by lagged minimum wages and the lagged state aggregate employment rate (both of which are good predictors of minimum wages), the minimum wage parameter is effectively unchanged at -0.230 (0.047). Model 3 fits no fixed effects. The minimum wage parameter remains negative and the regression R 2 indicates that the minimum wage on its own explains about 5% of the total variation in the youth employment-population ratio across time and states. Our elasticity is roughly half of that typically found by Burkhauser et al. (2000) , who use monthly data, a shorter time period, and additional control variables. Sabia (2008) , working with data for retail and small business employment, produces elasticities similar to ours over a longer sample period .
In the first three models the Durbin-Watson statistic 14 indicates substantial serial correlation in the residuals, which means that inference cannot be based on the computed standard errors. In Model 4 we allow the error process to be an AR(1): this can be seen as correcting the estimate in Model 1 for serial correlation. The estimated parameter is about a fifth smaller and the standard error about a quarter larger.
Nevertheless, the estimate remains significant at conventional levels. The next model considers the possibility that state employment is conditioned by a state-specific trend which might be itself correlated with the state minimum wage. Model 5 allows for this with a state-specific linear trend. We observe that the estimate is about half that of the comparable (but no-state-trend) Model 1 lending some support to the above suggestion. However, the minimum wage coefficient remains negative and statistically significant within the consensus range. Some recent papers have argued that the negative effect of minimum wages is an artefact of the omission of state-(or county-) specific trends (Allegretto et al., 2008 , Addison et al., 2008 Dube et al., 2007) . In our data, including trends diminishes the effect of minimum wages but does not eliminate it.
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There is evidence of serial correlation in the residuals and this is catered for in Model 6 where we allow for an AR (1) there is a negative effect of the minimum wage, it must be small.
The standard panel estimator imposes three restrictions on a model:
1. the structural parameters are constant across cross-sections and over time;
2. the equation errors are independent over cross-sections;
3. the equation errors are independent over time.
Allowing for an AR(1) residual as in some specifications in Table 2 relaxes the third assumption; in Table 3 we consider the first two. The last column of Table 3 presents z-tests of the independence of error processes over cross-sections (cross-sectional independence, CSI), based on the sum of squared terms below the main diagonal of the 48×48 residual correlation matrix. 18 There is 18 More specifically, the correlation matrix is formed from the residuals of state-specific regressions. Before computing the correlation matrix we first filter the residuals using the parameters from a statespecific AR(1). R. A. Fisher's tanh transformation is applied to the correlations to reduce them to approximate normality so that the sum-of-squares will be chi-square under the null of independence.
only limited evidence of cross-sectional dependence in Model 10 and even less in Model 11. In contrast in Model 12, one finds that not eliminating time fixed-effects leads to very strong cross-sectional dependence. It is natural to associate this with the macro U.S. business cycle, perhaps with federal monetary policy.
CSI effects a great simplification in the econometric environment because it facilitates GLS estimation of the panel. If CSI holds, the covariance matrix of the error process is block-diagonal with the 32×32 temporal covariance matrices of the states ranged down the diagonal. These can be estimated from the time series of each state and GLS straight-forwardly applied. 19 Estimating these temporal covariance matrices under the assumption that they are generated by state-specific AR(1)s, we obtain the GLS estimates in Model 13. The average elasticity is estimated as -0.202 with a standard error of 0.114, implying a one-tailed p-level of about 4%.
Starting with Model 13, one can test the assumption, implicit in the models in Table 2 , that the elasticities are common across states. This entails 47 restrictions on the estimates in Model 13. Holding constant the covariance matrix, the Wald-test of these restrictions has a p-level less than 10 -7 .
As feasible GLS, the estimator in Model 13 has asymptotically optimal properties and dominates the others considered so far. Its chief rival is Model 6, but the latter imposes parameter-equality, which we have seen is rejected by the data. An interesting facet of this is that the misspecification implied by parameter equality
To produce a z-statistic, we use the approximation, also due to Fisher, that if X is distributed as chisquare with k degrees of freedom, then X 2 is approximately normal with mean 1 2 − k and unit variance. 19 Things become trickier when there are correlations between states. Even if the errors are independent over time, so that simple SUR techniques are apparently available, the sample covariance matrix will be singular in our case, since we have more cross-sections than time periods. While there are recent techniques for dealing with this (Bai, 2006; Peseran, 2006) , cross-sectional independence means we do not need to trawl these waters. manifests itself as cross-sectional dependence: the z-test applied to the residuals from Model 6 yields a value of z = 3.78.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The conclusion of this paper is that there now appears to be a strong negative correlation between minimum wages and youth employment detectable in the current panel of U.S. states. Our results are not dependent on a particular choice of RHS conditioning variables and are robust to the omission of any set of such that would be captured by state-specific time-polynomials and common U.S.-effects. Figure 1 describes how the increased variance in minimum wages has allowed more certain inference. A 1992 researcher, using our methodology, would have found no significant minimum wage effects but, transported to the present, would find nothing inconsistent between his 95% confidence interval from the 1992 version of the minimalist regression (appropriately corrected for residual serial correlation) and a significant minimum wage parameter of around -0.2. A natural question is whether these new data genuinely shed light on a preexisting relationship or constitute a new phenomenon. We can offer an answer to this by a Chow test, splitting the data at 2000. We base the test on model 6 and hold constant the fixed effects, the trend parameters, and the autoregressive parameter at their full-sample values, thus allowing only the minimum wage elasticity to vary 20 Note the standard errors in Figure 1 are from the OLS and are not corrected for residual correlation. across sub-samples. We find an F-statistic of 1.23, indicating no inconsistency across sub-samples. The point here is that the earlier data are essentially uninformative about the relationship and thus are consistent with stronger results in the later data. Similar results are found for splits at earlier years such as 1992. 
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